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1 Introduction
Since Becker (1964), human capital theory views education as a production factor. More
educated workers have a higher marginal productivity, and obtain higher rewards as a
result of wage competition between potential employers. However, the direct contribu-
tion of education to physical production does not account for the total contribution to
revenue. Education enhances allocative ability (Welch, 1970), ability to learn (Schultz,
1975, Rosenzweig 1995), and improves workerscapacity to deal with changing conditions
(Nelson and Phelps, 1966). Schooling features adaptability returns, and, as suggested
by Welch (1970) or Rosenzweig (1995), these returns increase with the complexity of the
production process. The reason why adaptability skills and technological complexity mat-
ter relies on an assumption that is often implicit. Workers face mobility costs between
di¤erentiated jobs. Adaptability skills lower these costs, while technological complexity
increases them.
This paper o¤ers a microfoundation for adaptability returns to schooling and tech-
nological complexity. This microfoundation involves matching frictions and knowledge
mismatch. We assume that the state of knowledge, viewed as a continuum of basic abil-
ities/elds, is symbolized by a circle. Each agent, individual or rm, is characterized by
a particular location on the circle, which reects individual tastes and social background.
Individuals learn at school a subset of knowledge. This subset is centered in individual
location, and its measure increases with the schooling duration. Firms choose the tech-
nology, that is the subset of knowledge that is required to operate on the technology. This
subset is centered in rms location. We refer to its measure as technological complexity.
More a technology is complex, more it is productive. However, a worker can operate on a
job only if the subset of knowledge embodied in the technology belongs to the subset he
learnt at school.
There are two sources of mismatch between jobs and workers. On the one hand, the
skill requirements of technologies may outweigh the skills learnt by the workers. Firms
and workers make expectations on the decisions taken by the other side of the market.
If rms are too optimistic regarding the skills of the workforce, or if workers undervalue
technological complexity, many employment relationships turn down. Conversely, if rms
are too pessimistic, or if workers are very careful, employment relationships are not very
productive, and some schooling investment may be wasted. On the other hand, the as-
signment process may fail to bring together workers and technologies of similar locations.
Even though workers embody considerable elds of knowledge and technologies are rela-
tively simple, employment relationships may not work well because the skills required by
technologies di¤er a lot from workersskills.
Such a "mismatch of talents" motivates schooling, while it inhibits technological com-
plexity. Because workers do not know in advance which skills are required by their future
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job, they have incentives to invest in education in order to become more adaptable and
form matches with more rms. In a same way, since rms have to make their technological
choice before they know their future employee, they can be reluctant to choose a high
level of complexity. Consequently, education is increasing in technological complexity as
workers get schooling in order to reduce the risk of technological failure and technological
complexity is increasing in education as the risk of failure to recruit an adequate worker
is lower.
We expose our results in four steps.
1. We characterize the Walrasian allocation. It is useful as a benchmark to evaluate
the e¤ects of matching imperfections. In that allocation, matching is e¢ cient: rms of
a given location only meet workers of the same location. All workers choose the same
schooling duration, and all rms set the same technological complexity. The schooling
duration is such that the subset of knowledge embodied in each worker coincides with the
subset of knowledge required to operate the technology. Technological complexity then
maximizes output.
2. The frictional allocation experiences two departures from the Walrasian allocation.
Firstly, we assume Nash bargaining over match surplus. We know from Grout (1984) and
Acemoglu (1996) this may lead to a hold-up problem. Each party pays the full marginal
cost of investment but only obtains a share of the marginal reward. We abstract from
this source of ine¢ ciency. We assume there are no other costs to education than the
time spent nonemployed, and there are no other costs to technological complexity than
the risk of technological failure. The foregone earnings nature of each cost implies that
both the return and cost of education are held-up and each side of the market chooses
the e¢ cient decision given the informational constraints of the economy. Secondly, we
take as a starting point that e¢ cient matching requires a degree of coordination that is
unfeasible. Frictions result in the misallocation of workers to jobs. We assume random
matching between jobs and workers: a given worker may meet any rm with a uniform
density. Workers can no longer set education so as to match the knowledge demand of
a particular technology. Equivalently, rms can no longer set technological complexity
so as to match a particular bundle of workers skills. Both strategies are too risky, as
they imply a major risk of failure. Consequently, rms reduce technological complexity
compared to the Walrasian allocation, while workers increase education. The presence
of frictions implies less complex and less productive technologies, more time spent in
education, and technological unemployment/nonemployment due to mismatch.
3. Taste heterogeneity vis-à-vis the di¤erent elds of knowledge is not the only source
of heterogeneity. The presence of workers of di¤erent educational levels may alter the
welfare of each person. To tackle with this issue, we introduce heterogeneity in scholastic
ability. There are two types of workers: high-ability and low-ability ones. The main result
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can be stated as follows: the welfare of individuals of a specic group always increases
with the proportion of workers of this group. Changes in the distribution of types a¤ect
all workers through reactions of the other side of the market. Facing an increase in the
share of high-ability workers, rms increase technological complexity. This benets to the
more able whose skills are under-used in equilibrium. However, it is detrimental to less
able individuals who are compelled to set a longer schooling duration.
4. Education reduces the risk of technological failure. Our model, therefore, appears
well-suited to the study of risk aversion. Risk aversion originates a precautionary demand
for education. Facing more educated workers, rms raise technological complexity, thereby
creating the risks the workers fear. As long as workers risk aversion is higher than
employers, risk aversion originates income risk. In addition, when workers di¤er in risk
aversion, those who have higher risk aversion create a negative externality on all workers
because they make rms set more complex technologies.
The interplay between adaptability and technological complexity can be viewed as a
strong form of capital-skill complementary. As such, it is line with well-established empir-
ical evidence. For instance, Bartel and Lichtenberg (1987) use the average age of capital
as a proxy for technological advancement and show that more educated workers have a
comparative advantage in implementing newer technologies. Dunne and Schmitz (1995)
and Doms et al (1997) use plant level data and nd that technologically more advanced
plants employ more educated and more skilled workers. Of course, these results do not
prove that more educated workers are better placed to operate on more complex tech-
nologies. However, newer or advanced technologies that embody computing equipment
and/or that increase the level of automation are more complex to use and often involves
multidimensional skills as minimum language skills, reading skills or basic math skills. In
turn, there is evidence that the implementation of a more complex production process is
associated to increased di¢ culties at the recruitment stage. Baron et al (1985) use data
for hires collected in 1980. They show that the number of applicants interviewed per job
o¤er increases with associated educational requirement. They also nd that employers
seeking to ll their positions with high educational requirements devote a larger number
of hours to recruiting.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, and
compares the Walrasian allocation with the frictional allocation. Section 3 considers two
extensions, namely worker heterogeneity in scholastic ability and risk aversion. Section 4
relates our paper to the literature. Section 5 concludes.
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2 The model
2.1 General assumptions
We describe a one-period environment where a continuum of workers normalized to one
faces a continuum of rms of identical size. There is a unique consumption good. Both
rms and workers are risk-neutral and make ex-ante investments: workers choose their
education, while rms determine technological complexity. Each rm meets one and only
one worker and reciprocally.
Education. Let K  [0; 1] denote knowledge, viewed as a collection of primary elds.
Each individual has a location i on the space of knowledge, which represents her tastes
vis-à-vis the di¤erent elds of knowledge. Locations are uniformly distributed on the space
of knowledge. Each individual is endowed with one unit of time she divides between a
schooling period s 2 [0; 1] and a participation period 1   s. Schooling gives access to
a subset of knowledge. The measure of this subset increases with schooling investment.
Let Hsi  K be the subset of knowledge acquired by a worker whose location is i and
educational investment is s. Let also H (s) denote the Lebesgue measure of Hsi. Then,
Hsi = [i H (s) =2; i+H (s) =2], accounting for the fact that locations are dened modulo
one. The function H is endowed with the following properties.
Assumption 1 (i) H 0 (s) > 0 for all s  0, (ii) H 00 (s)  0 for all s  0, (iii) H (0) = 0,
(iv) H (1)  1
Technology. A technology converts knowledge into a production process. Firms de-
termine technological complexity. Increasing technological complexity raises job produc-
tivity. However, it reduces the probability that a given worker can operate on the job.
Formally, choosing a technology consists in picking randomly a location j on the space of
knowledge, and then choosing the scope of skills c 2 (0; 1] required to operate on the tech-
nology. The corresponding subset of the space of knowledge is Hcj = [j   c=2; j + c=2].
Output per unit of time spent working y depends on workers subset of knowledge Hsi
and technology-specic subset of knowledge Hcj according to
y (Hcj;Hsi) =
(
f (c) if Hcj  Hsi
0 otherwise
(1)
Equation (1) presents an O-ring type technology (Kremer, 1993). Production involves a
combination of di¤erent tasks. The number of tasks increases with technological com-
plexity. If all tasks are completed, production takes place. If at least one task is not
performed correctly, there is no output.
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Assumption 2 (i) f 0 (c) > 0 for all c  0, (ii) f 00 (c)  0, for all c  0, (iii) f (0) = 0
To close the model, we need to specify how rms and workers are allocated to each
other, and how output is divided between the two parties. Let 
l (i) denotes the set of
rmslocation the worker may meet. The set 
l (i) species a non-empty subset of K,
potentially restricted to a singleton, and a distribution function on that subset. Similarly,
let 
k (j) denotes the set of workerslocations the rm may meet.
2.2 E¢ cient matching
In this sub-section, we describe the case of e¢ cient matching. Workers and rms are
perfectly assigned to each other: workers of a given location only meet rms from the
same location, and vice-versa. Formally, 
l (i) = fig and 
k (j) = fjg. We rst analyze
the Walrasian allocation, and then study the decentralized mechanism with ex-post rent-
sharing.
Walrasian allocation. For each pair of worker and rm, the problem is to maximize
production, that is
(sw (i) ; cw (i)) argmax
si;ci
(1  si) f (ci) (2)
subject to H (si)  ci.
Proposition 1 The Walrasian allocation can be summarized by the unique pair (sw; cw) 2
(0; 1) (0; 1) such that:
(i) sw (i) = sw and cw (j) = cw for all (i; j) 2 [0; 1] [0; 1]
(ii) H (sw) = cw
(iii) f (cw) = (1  sw) f 0 (cw)H 0 (sw)
Point (i) states that all workers have the same schooling duration, and all rms set the
same technological complexity. Point (ii) says that workers get schooling so as to match
rmstechnological complexity. Equivalently, rms determine technological complexity
so as to coincide with workersembodied knowledge. Finally, equation (iii) states that
optimal schooling equates marginal cost and marginal benet. The left-hand side is the
marginal cost, which consists of foregone production. The right-hand side is the marginal
benet, equal to marginal output times the fraction of time spent working.
E¢ cient matching with ex-post rent-sharing. Output is divided between the rm and
the worker according to the asymmetric Nash solution to the bargaining problem. If w
denotes the wage per unit of time spent working,  2 (0; 1) common workersbargaining
power and  rms prot, we have
w = y and  = (1  ) y (3)
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Agents choose investments to maximize expected payo¤s, rationally expecting the invest-
ment achieved by the other side of the market. Once the schooling period is completed,
each worker is allocated to a rm. Then, output is determined according to (1).
Workers investment in education and rms technological complexity jointly result
from:
bs 2 argmax
s
f(1  s) f (c) ; H (s)  cg (4)bc 2 argmax
c
f(1  s) (1  ) f (c) ; H (s)  cg (5)
Proposition 2 (i) The set of equilibria is
E = f(c; s) 2 [0; H (1)] [0; 1] ; H (s) = cg (6)
(ii) (cw; sw) 2 E and it strictly pareto-dominates the other allocations
Multiple equilibria suggests that there are huge market failures. For instance, c =
s = 0 and c = H (1) with s = 1 are two highly ine¢ cient equilibria. However, the
Walrasian allocation belongs to the set of equilibria, and it pareto-dominates the other
allocations.
2.3 Random matching
In this sub-section, we focus on the situation where matching is random. We assume
that 
 (i) = f[0; 1] ; Ug for all i 2 [0; 1], where U is the uniform law. Similarly for rms,

 (j) = f[0; 1] ; Ug for all j 2 [0; 1]. Each worker meets a rm picked from the whole set of
locations, and equivalently for rms. Output is still determined by ex-post rent sharing.
Educational investment. Each worker maximizes her indirect utility function. As
we are only interested in symmetric equilibrium, we consider a workers i schooling in-
vestment, taking as given the common technological complexity set by rms. Optimal
schooling results from
bsi 2 argmax
s
Pr [Hcj  Hsi j c; i and j 2 
 (i)] (1  s) f (c) (7)
The objective is the probability of matching technology-specic skill requirements, times
the output part accruing to the worker. But,
Pr [Hcj  Hsi j c; i and j 2 
 (i)] = Pr [x+ i+ c  i+H (s)] (8)
where x is the distance between workers and rms locations. Finally,
Pr [Hcj  Hsi j c; i and j 2 
 (i)] = H (s)  c (9)
7
The latter probability does not depend on workers location. Optimal schooling results
from bs 2 argmax
s
(H (s)  c) (1  s) f (c) (10)
The rst-order condition is necessary. It can be written as follows:
(H (bs)  c) f (c) = (1  bs)H 0 (bs) f (c) (11)
The left-hand side is the marginal cost of education, which consists in foregone expected
earnings. This accounts for the matching probability H (bs)   c. The right hand-side is
the marginal benet. It is equal to the marginal e¤ect of education on the matching
probability due to increased knowledge, times the time spent working, times the wage.
Simplifying, we get
H (bs) = c+ (1  bs)H 0 (bs) (12)
Equation (12) displays several crucial features. First,H (bs) > c. Due to randommatching,
workers cannot a¤ord to get schooling so as to match technological complexity because
the probability of meeting a rm with the same location is nil. This result also holds when
technological complexity becomes arbitrarily small (i.e. c = 0): heterogeneity in rms
locations alone implies workers need to train. Second, workers expect some technological
failure, as they bear the risk 1   (H (bs)  c) > 0 of not being successful while trying to
produce. Third, even though workers only maximize their share of expected output, the
resulting schooling investment does neither depend on output, nor on bargaining power.
This is due to the foregone earnings nature of the schooling cost, which implies both gains
and costs from education are proportional to workersshare of output. In the terminology
of Acemoglu (1996), both the returns and the costs from investment are held-up.
Technological choice. Each rm chooses independently technological complexity, tak-
ing as given the choice of other rms, as well as workerschoice. Due to the symmetry
between the workers problem and the rms, optimal technological complexity results
from bc 2 argmax
c
(H (s)  c) (1  ) (1  s) f (c) (13)
The rst-order condition writes down1
(1  ) (1  s) f (bc) = (H (s)  bc) (1  ) (1  s) f 0 (bc) (14)
The left-hand side is the marginal cost of technological complexity, which consists of a
lower probability to produce successfully. The right-hand side is the marginal return to
complexity, which consists of a higher productivity. Simplifying,
bc = H (s)  f (bc) =f 0 (bc) (15)
1In the proof of Proposition 2 exposed in the Appendix, we rigorously study rms and workers
maximization programs.
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Several points should be noted. First, technological complexity is set lower than H (s).
As in the case of education detailed previously, this property is due to random match-
ing. Firms expect to meet workers from the whole distribution of locations. Setting
technological complexity close to H (s) would expose the rm to a huge risk of techno-
logical failure. Second, technological complexity is increasing in education. An educated
workforce stimulates the introduction and use of riskier and more productive technologies.
Finally, technological complexity does not depend on bargaining power: the marginal cost
of complexity is of the foregone-earnings type, so both the cost and return to technological
complexity are proportional to earnings.
Equilibrium. An equilibrium is a pair (s; c) solving s = bs (c) and c = bc (s).
Proposition 3 (i) There exists a unique non-trivial equilibrium, that is an equilibrium
with s 2 (0; 1)
(ii) s > sw and c < cw
People educated longer and rms set less complex technologies in the frictional econ-
omy than in the Walrasian environment. These properties are due to the imperfection of
the assignment mechanism. Nothing prevents workers and rms to meet partners very
far from their location on the space of knowledge. Agents alter their behavior to reduce
the extent of the mismatch. As covering the whole circle would imply to spend the whole
time endowment in education, randommatching means technological unemployment takes
place in equilibrium. The rate of unemployment is u = 1  (1  s)H 0 (s).
An important property of equilibrium is that it does not depend on workersbargain-
ing power. The following result proves that the decentralized allocation is constrained
e¢ cient.
Proposition 4 Let u (c; s) and v (c; s) denote, respectively, workersand rmspayo¤s.
(i) The decentralized allocation maximizes output
(ii) The decentralized allocation maximizes expected payo¤s, i.e. u (c; s) > u (c; s)
and v (c; s) > v (c; s) for all (c; s) 6= (c; s)
The decentralized allocation is e¢ cient: not only output is maximized, but no other
allocation can improve welfare. Despite agents make ex-ante investments, assignment
of workers to jobs is random, and wages are determined by ex-post rent-sharing, the
decentralized equilibrium is constrained e¢ cient. This result departs from Acemoglu
(1996). It can be understood by carefully examining equations (11) and (14). For each
type of investment, i.e. education and technological complexity, the marginal return is
typically too low as the agent only maximizes her share of output. However, and for the
same reason, the marginal cost is also too low. These two distortions o¤set each other,
and the decentralized economy achieves the e¢ cient allocation.
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3 Extensions
In this section, we consider two extensions: workersheterogeneity in ability to learn, and
risk aversion.
3.1 Hierarchical heterogeneity
In the basic framework, workers only di¤er in location. We now suppose workers di¤er in
scholastic ability a, which represents their capacity to learn. The measure of the subset
of knowledge Hsia obtained by the workers is H (a; s).
Assumption 3 (i) H1 (a; s) > 0, (ii) H12 (a; s) > 0, (iii) H2 (a; s) > 0, (iv) H22 (a; s) <
0, (v) H (a; 0) = 0, and (vi) lim
s!1
H (a; s) = 1
(i) says that the marginal productivity of scholastic ability is positive, (ii) says that
the marginal productivity is increasing in ability, (iii) to (v) correspond to properties
(i) to (iii) in Assumption 1. Finally, (vi) says that agents can learn the whole space of
knowledge if they spend their whole time endowment at school. This assumption ensures
that all agents will have a chance of getting a job in equilibrium.
There are two types of workers: p1  p 2 (0; 1) high-ability workers whose ability is
a1, and p2  1  p low-ability workers, whose ability is a2 < a1.
Output per unit of time spent working is now given by
y (Hsia;Hcj) =
(
f (c) if Hcj  Hsia
0 outside
(16)
In the case of e¢ cient matching, rms and workers know ex-ante which type of agents
they will meet ex-post. In that case, Proposition 4 still holds: the matching place is per-
fectly segmented by location and schooling attainment, and the decentralized equilibrium
replicates the Walrasian allocation.
The case of random matching is more interesting: rms and workers do not know
ex-ante who they will meet ex-post. We now investigate this case.
Workers choose education rationally expecting rmscommon technological complex-
ity. This yields:
H (ai; bsi) = c+ (1  bsi)H2 (ai; bsi) (17)
Education is still increasing in technological complexity. The e¤ect of scholastic ability
is ambiguous: due to complementarity between ability and schooling in knowledge acqui-
sition, the direct e¤ect of ability is to raise schooling. However, high-ability agents need
less education to get the same knowledge. Formally, it depends on (1  bsi)H12 H1. The
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key point is that H (a; bs) is strictly increasing in a. Indeed,
dH (a; bs)
da
= H1 +H2
dbs
da
= H1 +H2
(1  s)H12  H1
2H2   (1  s)H22 > 0
While setting technological complexity, rms take into account workers heterogeneity
according to
bc 2 argmax
c
X
i
pimax fH (ai; si)  c; 0g (1  ) (1  si) f (c) (18)
Unlike the case with homogenous workers, the rm may choose technological complexity
so as to exclude low-ability workers from the economic activity.2 As workersbest-response
prevents the occurrence of such a situation in equilibrium, we only focus on an interior
maximum. The rst-order condition reads as
bc = H (s1; s2)  f (bc) =f 0 (bc) (19)
where
H (s1; s2) =
P
i pi (1  si)H (ai; si)P
i pi (1  si)
(20)
Technological complexity is strictly increasing in workersmean subset of knowledge.
Proposition 5 Let ui (c; s) denote the expected payo¤ of a type-i worker, endowed with
schooling s and facing technological complexity c.
(i) There exists a unique equilibrium;
(ii) Equilibrium schooling and technological complexity are increasing in the share
of high-ability workers, that is dsi =dp > 0, and dc
=dp > 0;
(iii) Welfare of a given group is increasing in the share of this group, that is
dui (s

i ; c
) =dpi > 0.
As in Acemoglu (1996), agentsdecisions have an impact on other agents through the
reaction of the other side of the market, that is rms. High-ability workers make easier
the implementation of more complex technologies. Equilibrium technological complexity,
therefore, is increasing in the share of high-ability individuals. From the schooling invest-
ment equation (17), this implies education duration also rises. Those developments are
similar to Acemoglu: rising the share of those who have the highest schooling return (or
2The mechanism would be similar to Acemoglu (1999). In this contribution, there are two types of
workers, skilled and unskilled, and rms set capital intensity before matching a worker. However, capital
can be resold without loss on the capital market. Firms choose to do so whenever the gap between a
skilled and an unskilled worker is su¢ ciently large.
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the lowest schooling cost in Acemoglu) translates into an increase in the schooling attain-
ment of all individuals. The crucial di¤erence, however, is illustrated by point (iii). If
the welfare of high-ability individuals is increasing in their share in the whole population,
the welfare of low-ability individuals is decreasing. High-ability workers exert a negative
externality on low-ability workers.
3.2 Risk aversion
In this sub-section, we suppose both rms and workers are risk-averse. A type r agent has
the following Von Neuman-Morgenstern utility function u (z) = z1 r , where r 2 [0; 1)
is the absolute risk aversion. Entrepreneurs are of type k, while workers are of type l.
The bargained wage is given by
w 2 argmax
w
f (1  l) ln [(1  s)w] + (1  ) (1  k) ln [(1  s) (f (c)  w)]g (21)
Therefore,
w = f (c) (22)
where  = (1 l)
(1 l)+(1 )(1 k) . The wage is decreasing in workers risk aversion, and in-
creasing in entrepreneurs risk aversion (this is a standard result). Educational investment
results from bs 2 argmax
s
(H (s)  c) [(1  s)f (c)]1 l (23)
This yields
H (bs) = c+ 1
1  lH
0 (bs) (1  bs) (24)
The schooling investment equation features two properties. First, and as in the case
with risk-neutral individuals, the bargaining power does not a¤ect schooling investment.
Second, there is a precautionary demand for education. As the left-hand side of equation
(24) is decreasing in education, optimal schooling is increasing in risk aversion.3
Similarly, technological complexity is determined by
bc 2 argmax
c
(H (s)  c) [(1  ) (1  s) f (c)]1 k (25)
This yields bc = H (s)  1
1  k f (bc) =f 0 (bc) (26)
A crucial feature of equation (26) is that technological complexity decreases with risk
aversion. The reason is similar to the one behind workers precautionary demand for
3Gould et al (2001) also focus on the precautionary demand for education in a two-sector model with
sector-specic uncertainty and logarithmic preferences. However, education is a binary decision, rms
technology is exogenous and Gould et al do not derive the normative implications below.
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education, but it runs the other way around. Risk-averse entrepreneurs have a demand
for insurance. As no insurance is available, they respond to educational investments by
setting a conservative technological complexity, that is lower than the one which would
be chosen by a social planner aiming at maximizing output.
The equilibrium is a xed-point of the mutual best-response strategies.
Proposition 6 (i) There exists a unique non-trivial equilibrium;
(ii) @s (l; k) =@l > 0 and @s (l; k) =@k < 0, while @c (l; k) =@l > 0 and
@c (l; k) =@k < 0.
Workers tend to invest too much in education, while entrepreneurs tend to set too
simple technologies. In both cases, ine¢ ciency is a consequence of uninsured income risk.
We may observe in equilibrium both over- and under-education, as well as too complex
or too simple technologies. However, the resulting allocation never maximizes output.
An interesting feature of the analysis is reported by claim (ii). Income risk originates a
precautionary demand for education, yet it exacerbates risk. The reason is due to the
reaction of rms that increase technological complexity when education rises.
This suggests another extension, where workers ex-ante di¤er with respect to risk
aversion. The intuition suggests that the more risk averse workers create a negative
externality on all workers, as their increased schooling duration creates incentives for
rms to raise technological complexity. To show this, we consider two types of workers:
p1 = p 2 (0; 1) risk haters, whose risk aversion is 1 2 (0; 1), and p2 = 1 p risk tolerants,
whose risk aversion is 2, with 0 < 2 < 1.
Proposition 7 Suppose k = 0, 0  2 < 1 and let ui (c; s) denote the expected payo¤
of a type-i worker endowed with schooling s and facing technological complexity c.
(i) There exists a unique non-trivial equilibrium;
(ii) dsi =dp > 0 and dc
=dp > 0;
(iii) dui (c; si ) =dp < 0 for i = 1; 2.
As expected, technological complexity increases with the share of risk haters. In turn,
schooling investments also increase with p. In addition, both risk haters and risk tolerants
lose in terms of welfare. This result may have important implications. It shows that risk
aversion may originate income risk in the society. There is a widespread belief in the
society thereby economic performance strongly depends on risk-taking individuals, while
growth transfers economic situations from the risk averse to the risk takers. As long as
education protects from income risk and risky technologies depend on education, this may
well be the exact opposite.
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4 Related literature
Our paper relates to the literature on ex-ante investments when there are matching fric-
tions.
Acemoglu (1996) provides the seminal analysis. He considers heterogenous agents who
set their investment before they match. Frictions mean that there is uncertainty about
future partners type. The magnitude of investment cannot be contracted, and output is
split ex-post between rm and worker. Acemoglu sheds light on a pecuniary externality.
Due to agentsheterogeneity and random matching, increasing investment in a sub-group
of individuals increases investment on the other side of the market, which improves ex-
pected payo¤s for all. Our paper starts from the same market situation. However, the
nature of investment di¤ers. Rather than investments in human and physical capital, we
focus on investments in adaptability skills and technological complexity. This allows us to
obtain di¤erent results. Namely, education is typically longer than in the Walrasian out-
come, while technological complexity is typically lower. In addition, increasing education
in a sub-group of workers is generally good for rms, but bad for all the workers.
Acemoglu (1999) and Albrecht and Vroman (2002) reach conclusions that are closer
to ours. They both consider a random matching model in which there are two types of
workers, skilled and unskilled, and two types of jobs, complex and simple. They show
that an increase in skilled proportion can make rms turn down unskilled applicants
more frequently. In Albrecht and Vroman, rms increase the proportion of complex jobs,
which reduces the employment prospects of the unskilled who cannot perform on such
jobs by assumption. In Acemoglu, rms increase capital intensity and reject unskilled
applicants because the option value of unlled jobs is higher.4 Our paper complements
these earlier studies in four ways. (i) We are interested in technological choices rather
than in recruitment practices or capital choices. Technological complexity is a continuous
variable, and the skills required to perform on the technology are endogenous. As setting
technological complexity does not involve any direct costs, having a job does not feature
an option value as in Acemoglu. Applicants may be rejected because they do not have
the adequate set of skills, and not because they are insu¢ ciently productive. (ii) There is
horizontal di¤erentiation between jobs in our paper, while there is vertical di¤erentiation
in the two others. There are no good jobs and bad jobs in our model. All the jobs have
the same technological complexity, but the set of required skills di¤ers from one job to
another. (iii) Horizontal di¤erentiation implies that workers are neither always employable
nor never employable. Education alters the employment probability at the margin. (iv)
4Acemoglu rst develop a static version of his model. Firms choose capital intensity before they meet a
worker. However, they can resell capital once a worker is met at no cost. An increase in skilled proportion
raises capital intensity, up to the point where keeping an unskilled worker is not worth paying the capital
cost.
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Most importantly, education and technological complexity are both endogenous in our
paper. Acemoglu and Albrecht and Vroman focus on the implications of educational
choices on rmsdecisions. We also examine how rmsbehavior alters the schooling
incentives.
Nelson and Phelpsnotion of adaptability has been pursued by Krueger and Kumar
(2002) and Aghion et al (2002) in growth models. The former assume that general (by
opposition to vocational) education reduces the probability the workers su¤er a loss of
task-specic productivity following the introduction of a new technology. The latter
assume new technologies are sector-specic and workers must be adaptable to implement
any such new technology. The longer the schooling period when young, the more likely
the worker can use the new technology when old. In our paper, educated workers are
more adaptable not because they can perform better on new jobs but because they can
form matches with more rms. A close assumption is used by Lloyd-Ellis (1999) in a
growth model with endogenous technological change. In his model, minimum skill levels
are required to implement new but equiproductive technologies and workers di¤er in
the range of technologies they can implement. However, the skill acquisition process is
exogenous.
The way we model mismatch borrows from Marimon and Zilibotti (1999). This is a
multi-sector matching model with ex-post Nash bargaining over the match surplus where
workers have (symmetric) sector-specic skills à la Salop (1979). Firms and workers are
distributed along the perimeter of a technological circle. The productivity of a pair is
strictly decreasing in the distance between rms and workers locations. Matching is
random and job o¤ers above some critical distance are always rejected (see also Decreuse,
2008, for a di¤erent interpretation of the matching process). The relationship between
the productivity of a pair and the worker-rm distance is exogenous in Marimon and
Zilibotti. In a related setting in which education raises workersadaptability, Charlot et
al (2005) and Decreuse and Granier (2005) also suggest that matching frictions provide
incentives to schooling. In a model without education, Acemoglu and Pischke (2000)
also examine the trade-o¤ between productivity and probability of recruiting an adequate
worker. Our paper complements these earlier contributions by (i) setting microfoundations
to adaptability skills and technological complexity, and (ii) examining jointly the decisions
taken by the two sides of the market.
Finally, the idea whereby income risk creates a social demand for education is not
new. Gould et al (2001) propose a two-sector growth model that features such incentives
to schooling. However, the growth process is exogenous. Our paper goes a step further by
considering the implications of a more educated workforce on the incentives to set more
complex technologies.
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5 Conclusion
Why does education provide adaptability skills? There is a large body of evidence sug-
gesting that education is more than a production factor. In particular, education o¤ers
a bundle of skills that reduces the extent of mismatch and allow rms to use complex
technologies. However, the relationship between education, adaptability skills, and tech-
nological complexity is most of the time a black box. The purpose of this paper is to
provide an explicit microeconomic scenario in which the technological environment is en-
dogenous and there are adaptability returns to schooling. Our scenario is based on two
components: labor market frictions and knowledge mismatch. Firms and workers are lo-
cated on a knowledge space. Education widens the measure of the knowledge subset that
the worker embodies, while technological complexity expands the measure of the knowl-
edge subset that is required to operate on the job. Matching frictions result in location
mismatch.
We nd uncertainty with regard to the location of the future partner motivates school-
ing, while it inhibits technological complexity. Matching frictions, therefore, raise the need
for adaptability skills and lower incentives to adopt complex technologies. When workers
di¤er in scholastic ability, an increase in the proportion of high-ability individuals in-
creases technological complexity. The welfare of a given group (low-ability or high-ability
individuals) increases with the proportion of workers of this group. Finally, risk aver-
sion motivates a precautionary demand for education, which in turn creates income risk
through rmstechnological choices.
Our model is su¢ ciently simple to be used in a dynamic setting. The knowledge
space could expand over time and implications for growth could be derived. Innovations
location in the knowledge space could be biased, worsening the mismatch problem. The
description of matching frictions could also be enriched. These extensions are on our
research agenda.
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APPENDIX: PROOFS
Proof of proposition 1 Immediate.
Proof of proposition 2 (i) From the maximization program (4), workersbest response
to rmstechnological complexity c 2 (0; H (1)) is bs  bs (c) = H 1 (c). Similarly,
from the maximization program (5), rms best response to workers education
s 2 (0; 1) is bc  bc (s) = H (s). An equilibrium is a xed-point of mutual best
responses. Therefore, all (s; c) 2 (0; 1) (0; 1) such that H (s) = c are equilibria.
(ii) From Proposition 1, the Walrasian allocation satises H (sw) = cw. Therefore
(sw; cw) 2 E. As the Walrasian allocation maximizes output and expected pay-
o¤s are proportional to aggregate output, the Walrasian allocation is the unique
allocation that maximizes rmsand workersexpected payo¤s.
Proof of proposition 3 We rst establish the properties of workersand rmsinvest-
ments discussed in the text. Then, we show (i) and (ii).
Preliminary. The expected payo¤s of workers and rms are, respectively, u (c; s) =
(1  s) (H (s)  c) f (c) and v (c; s) = (1  s) (H (s)  c) (1  ) f (c).
Workers choice. Consider the workers maximization problem (10). If c = 0,
u (c; s) = 0 for all s 2 [0; 1]. If c > H (1), u (c; s) < 0 for all s 2 [0; 1] and the worker
rationally chooses not to get schooling, so that bs = 0. If c = H (1), the worker is
indi¤erent between not participating and setting s = 1. Finally, if c 2 (0; H (1)),
then workers optimal choice results from the rst-order condition (12). To show
this, note that u (c; 0) = u (c; 1) = 0, while u (c; s) > 0 for all s 2 (H 1 (c) ; H (1)).
By continuity, the rst-order condition is necessary. Now, consider the function 1
such that
1 (s; c) = H (s)  c+ (1  s)H 0 (s) (27)
We have 1 (0; c) < 0 and 1 (1; c) > 0 since c < H (1) by assumption and
@1 (s; c)
@s
= 2H 0 (s)  (1  s)H 00 (s) > 0 (28)
fromAssumption 1. By continuity, there exists a unique bs (c) such that 1 (bs (c) ; c) =
0. Therefore,
bs =
8>>><>>>:
[0; 1] if c = 0bs (c) if c 2 (0; H (1))
f0; 1g if c = H (1)
0 if c > H (1)
(29)
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When c 2 (0; H (1)), the implicit function theorem implies that
bs0 (c) =  @1 (bs (c) ; c) =@c
@1 (bs (c) ; c) =@s
=
1
2H 0 (bs (c))  (1  bs (c))H 00 (bs (c)) > 0 (30)
Moreover, lim
c!H(1)
bs (c) = 1, while lim
c!0
bs (c) = s0 > 0, where s0 is the unique solution
to
H (s0) = (1  s0)H 0 (s0) (31)
Firmschoice. Consider the rms maximization problem (13). A similar analysis
to the workers problem yields that
bc =
8><>:
[0; 1) if s = 0bc (s) if s 2 (0; 1)
[0; 1) if s = 1
(32)
where bc (s) is the unique solution to (15). To show this latter point, consider the
function 2 such that
2 (s; c) = c H (s) + f (c) =f 0 (c) (33)
We have 2 (s; 0) < 0 and 2 (s;H (1)) > 0 since s < 1 by assumption and
@2 (s; c)
@c
= 2  f (c) f 00 (c) =f 0 (c)2 > 0 (34)
fromAssumption 2. By continuity, there exists a unique bc (s) such that 1 (bs (c) ; c) =
0. The implicit function theorem implies that
bc0 (s) = H 0 (s)
2  f (c) f 00 (c) =f 0 (c) > 0 (35)
Finally, lim
s!0
bs (c) = 0, while lim
s!1
bc (s) = c1 < H (1), where c1 is the unique solution to
c1 = H (1)  f (c1) =f 0 (c1) (36)
(i) Remark rst that there are two trivial equilibria: (s; c) = (0; 0) and (s; c) =
(1; H (1)). Non-trivial equilibria are xed points of the functions bs (c) and bc (s).
Consider the function  such that
 (c) = c H (bs (c)) + f (c) =f 0 (c) (37)
A non-trivial equilibrium solves  (c) = 0, c 2 (0; H (1)), and s = bs (c). But
 (0) < 0,  (H (1)) > 0 and
 0 (c) = 1 H 0 (bs (c)) bs0 (c)
= 1  H
0 (bs (c))
2H 0 (bs (c))  (1  bs (c))H 00 (bs (c)) > 0
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Therefore, there exists a unique non-trivial equilibrium.
(ii) Let us rewrite the equilibrium conditions as follows:
f (c) = (1  s) f 0 (c)H 0 (s) (38)
H (s) = c+ (1  s)H 0 (s) (39)
Then, the only di¤erence between the decentralized allocation with random match-
ing and the Walrasian allocation comes from the second term of the right-hand side
of (39). As this term only depends on s, we have sw 6= s and cw 6= c. Suppose
c > cw. From (38), it implies s < sw. But, this requires from (39) that c < cw, a
contradiction. Therefore c < cw, which implies s > sw.
Proof of proposition 4 Let y (s; c) = (1  s) [H (s)  c] f (c) denote aggregate output.
As expected payo¤s of rms and workers are given by y (s; c) and (1  ) y (s; c),
any allocation that maximizes aggregate output also maximizes workersand rms
expected payo¤s. It comes that the decentralized allocation is the unique allocation
that maximizes output.
Proof of proposition 5 (i) Let bsi (c) denote the best response of a type-i worker to
technological complexity c. Details concerning the properties of function bsi (c) are
similar to those exposed in the preliminary of the proof of Proposition 3. Therefore,
we do not expose them twice. A non-trivial equilibrium is a xed-point of mutual
best responses, with si 6= 0, i = 1; 2. Consider the function  such that
 (c) = c H (bs1 (c) ; bs2 (c)) + f (c) =f 0 (c) (40)
An equilibrium is a vector (s1; s

2; c
) such that  (c) = 0, and si = bsi (c), i = 1; 2.
As  is continuous,  (0) < 0 and  (1) > 0, there exists an equilibrium. We now
prove  is strictly increasing. Hence,
 0 (c) = 2  H1
2H12   (1  s1)H122
  H2
2H22   (1  s2)H222
  f (c) f 00 (c) =f 0 (c)2 (41)
where si  bsi (c),H i  H i (bs1 (c) ; bs2 (c)),H i2  H2 (ai; bsi (c)), andH i22  H22 (ai; bsi (c)).
Assumptions 2 and 3 imply
 0 (c) > 2  H1
2H12
  H2
2H22
(42)
Taking the derivative of H given by (20) with respect to si, we get
H i =
pi (1  si)
p (1  s1) + (1  p) (1  s2)H
i
2 < H
i
2 (43)
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Therefore,
 0 (c) > 2  H
1
2
2H12
  H
2
2
2H22
> 0 (44)
(ii) Let H  H (p; s1; s2) to make the dependence vis-à-vis p explicit. From the
implicit function theorem, dc=dp has the sign of @H (p; s1; s

2) =@p. But,
@H (p; s1; s

2)
@p
=
(1  s1) (1  s2) (H1  H2)
[p (1  s1) + (1  p) (1  s2)]2
> 0 (45)
As bs0i (c) > 0, we also have dsi =dp > 0.
(iii) We have
dui (c
; si )
dp
=
@ui (c
; si )
@c
dc
dp
(46)
But,
@ui (c
; si )
@c
= (1  ) (1  si ) f 0 (c) fH (ai; si )  c   f (c) =f 0 (c)g (47)
Using (19),
@ui (c
; si )
@c
= (1  ) (1  si ) f 0 (c)

H (ai; s

i ) H (s1; s2)
	
(48)
The result follows from the fact H (a2; s2) < H (s

1; s

2) < H (a1; s

1).
Proof of proposition 6 (i) We proceed similarly to previous proofs. From (24), we can
dene the implicit function bs (c). It is strictly increasing and such that bs (0) = sl
and bs (H (1)) = 1, where sl 2 (0; 1) is implicitly dened by
H (sl) =
1
1  lH
0 (sl) (1  sl) (49)
Let
 (c) = c H (bs (c)) + 1
1  k
f (c)
f 0 (c)
(50)
We have  (0) < 0 while  (H (1)) > 0. In addition,
 0 (c) = 1 H 0 (bs (c)) dbs (c)
dc
+
1
1  k
f 0 (c)2   f (c) f 00 (c)
f 0 (c)2
(51)
But,
dbs (c)
dc
=
1
H 0 (bs (c)) + 1
1 l [H
0 (bs (c))  (1  bs (c))H 00 (bs (c))] < 1H 0 (bs (c)) (52)
Therefore  0 (c) > 0.
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(ii) Let bs (c)  bs (l; c) to highlight the dependence vis-à-vis l. From the implicit
function theorem, dc=dl has the sign of @bs (l; c) =@l > 0. It follows that
ds
dl
=
@bs (l; c)
@l
+
@bs (l; c)
@c
dc
dl
> 0 (53)
Similarly, it is easy to show that dc=dk > 0 and ds=dk > 0.
Proposition 7 Let
  p (1  1)
p (1  1) + (1  p) (1  2)
(54)
A non-trivial equilibrium (c; s1; s

2) solves
H (si) = c+
1
1  iH
0 (si) (1  si) , i = 1; 2 (55)
c = H (s1; s2)  f (c) =f 0 (c) (56)
where
H (s1; s2)   (1  s1)H (s1) + (1  ) (1  s2)H (s2)
 (1  s1) + (1  ) (1  s2) (57)
(i) From (24), we can dene two implicit functions bs1 (c) and bs2 (c), such as in the
proof of proposition 6, with bs1 (c) > bs2 (c) for all c 2 [0; 1), and bs1 (1) = bs2 (1) = 1.
Let
 (c) = c H (bs1 (c) ; bs2 (c)) + f (c) =f 0 (c) (58)
We have to show there exists a unique c 2 (0; 1) such that  (c) = 0. But,
 (0) < 0 and  (1) > 0. Moreover,  is derivable and
 0 (c) = 2 H1dbs1 (c)
dc
 H2dbs2 (c)
dc
  f (c) f 00 (c) =f 0 (c)2
> 2 H1dbs1 (c)
dc
 H2dbs2 (c)
dc
But
dbsi (c)
dc
=
1
H 0 (bsi (c))  11 i [H 00 (bsi (c)) (1  bsi (c)) H 0 (bsi (c))] < 1H 0 (bsi (c)) (59)
Hence,
 0 (c) > 2  H1
H1
  H2
H2
(60)
The result follows from the fact H i < Hi for i = 1; 2.
(ii) It is su¢ cient to show that dc=dp > 0, which in turn implies that dsi =dp > 0.
In this goal, let H (s1; s

2)  H (; s1; s2) to make the dependence vis-à-vis  explicit.
The implicit function theorem implies that dc=dp has the sign of
@H (; s1; s

2)
@p
=
@H (; s1; s

2)
@
d
dp
> 0 (61)
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since s1 > s

2.
(iii) We have
dui (c
; si )
dp
=
@ui (c
; si )
@c
dc
dp
(62)
As dc=dp > 0, it is su¢ cient to show @ui (c; si ) =@c > 0. But,
@ui (c
; si )
@c
=  (1  si )1 i
f 0 (c)
f (c)
f (c)1 i

  f (c
)
f 0 (c)
+ (1  i) [H (si )  c]

(63)
As c = H (s1; s

2)  f (c) =f 0 (c),
sign

@ui (c
; si )
@c

= sign

 i f (c
)
f 0 (c)
+ (1  i)

H (si ) H (s1; s2)

(64)
Since f 0 > 0 and H (s2) < H (s1; s2), @u2 (c; s2) =@c < 0.
Now, remark, H (s1) H (s1; s2) = 11 1H 0 (s1) (1  s1)  f (c) =f 0 (c). Therefore,
@u1 (c
; s1) =@c has the sign of
  f (c
)
f 0 (c)
+ (1  s1)H 0 (s1) (65)
But the strict concavity of H implies
(1  s1)H 0 (s1) < (1  s2)H 0 (s2) = (1  1)

H (s2) H (s1; s2) +
f 0 (c)
f (c)

(66)
It follows that @u1 (c; s1) =@c < 0.
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